review its information policy to confront current and future national security threats.
This paper will discuss the importance of information operations as an element of information policy within the context of military strategy. We will review the implications to the Army chaplaincy of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) participating in information operations. This will assist us to better understand the impact of UMT involvement in information operations, its affect on religious support and mission accomplishment. From this, we will propose alternative roles for the Unit Ministry Team (UMT).
Background
The concept of information operations is new. However, history has proven the importance of information as a part of national power within a larger national security policy.
Within the realm of international politics, the acronym, DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), illustrates the various elements of national power. Information consists of two elements: public diplomacy and information operations. Each element impacts the other in implementation of information policy. Therefore, we must examine the element of public diplomacy in order to better understand the importance of information operations in the context of military strategy. To begin our discussion, we must first agree on their definitions. According to Michael McClellan, Counselor for Public Diplomacy, US Embassy, Dublin, public diplomacy is a term that has only recently come into use with the merger of the United States Information
Agency into the Department of State. 3 He defines public diplomacy as "the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives." 4 Public diplomacy promotes the nation's interests by informing, engaging, and influencing people in other nations. 5 Information operations is a fairly new concept within the Department of Defense. As defined by U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Information Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect the adversary's and influence others' decision making processes, information and information systems, while protecting one's own information and information systems. 6 Current U.S. Policy and Army Doctrine An effective information policy will improve the external image of the U.S., assist in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy and the receptivity of U.S. initiatives abroad as well as build public support at home, and provide critical capabilities in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
Surveys suggest that world opinion, especially within the Arab and Muslim states towards the U.S., generates strong anti-Western sentiment. The U.S. has struggled in building consensus for its foreign policy initiatives, especially within the Arab and Muslim world and even across
Europe. The director of the Pew Research Center said earlier this year, "attitudes toward the United States 'have gone from bad to worse'." 7 Public diplomacy has not been effective in stemming the tide of negative attitudes toward the U.S. On the "home front", we need to look no further than our information policy with regard to the GWOT to see the effects of the current situation in Iraq on the will of the American public as well as with Congress. Over the course of the last two years, public opinion and the will of Congress has significantly declined toward U.S. involvement in Iraq.
Also, the U.S. led coalition has not been effective in winning the Iraqis' hearts and minds. 12 This results in an inconsistent message within U.S. foreign policy and a lack of unity of effort.
As we review the other element in U.S. information policy, information operations, the concept of influencing the enemy's decision making process or using information to benefit the The government recognizes that the primary role of religious support belongs to the religious community. The federal government also recognizes the special religious support needs of armed forces personnel and the difficulty of providing organized, effective religious support. The isolation, unique environment, and training for combat zones throughout the world generate special requirements for religious support. The federal government provides the chaplaincy to meet these needs.
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The chaplain does not accomplish this mission alone. Both, chaplain and chaplain assistant form a Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The UMT is a task organized, or mission-based team designed to provide religious, spiritual, and ethical needs for a particular unit's soldiers, families, and authorized civilians. RS includes three major functions: nurture the living, care for the dying, and honor the dead. 21 But, the UMT must function beyond that of a religious leader.
The UMT functions as a staff element responsible for coordinating the RS mission within the command. As noted in FM 1-05, Religious Support, the chaplain and chaplain assistant have specific staff responsibilities. These are to develop and implement the commander's RS program, exercise staff supervision and technical control over RS throughout the command, translate operational plans into battlespace ministry priorities, advise the commander and staff on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operation, and support the commander in the execution of CMO. 
Issues
Three issues must be addressed. First, a chaplain's authority for ministry in the military rests both with the government and the respective religious community from which the chaplain has received an endorsement.
Chaplains serve in the Army as clergy representing the respective faiths or denominations that endorse them. A chaplain's call, ministry, message, ecclesiastical authority, and responsibility come from the religious organization that the chaplain represents. Chaplains preach, teach, and conduct religious services, in accordance with the tenets and rules of their tradition, the principles of their faith, and the dictates of conscience.
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As we noted prior, a chaplain's role as religious leader is to provide three religious support During Phase IV, Stabilize, the tactical echelon UMT provides critical and timely RS to include critical event debriefings; pastoral care to the caregiver, casualties, and grieving unit members.
However, the UMT can provide valuable IO support to include establishing the IRC and developing relationships with local religious leaders. Also, the UMT may work closely with CMO in mutual supporting tasks. An important note, if the forces conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations, RS should take precedence. The UMT must assess critical tasks, both RS and IO, prioritize accordingly, and inform the commander. If the UMT participates in IO missions, the UMT would do so as a related capability, similar to the CMO or PAO. This would provide the UMT adequate distance from other IO missions or requirements.
An important note, the UMT at this echelon normally does not have the tactical, operational, technical, and at times faith maturity to conduct such sensitive operations in the IO realm. To ask a captain chaplain or young non-commissioned officer chaplain assistant to "win the hearts and minds" with people from a different culture who speak another language, and whose religion has different values, places the UMT and the IO mission at risk. Therefore, during the transition to Phase IV or in the initial stages of Phase IV, the Division or the equivalent UMT should ensure that the tactical echelon UMT has been trained and certified in conducting IO supporting tasks and consideration to host nation religious background. Also, the The UMT will participate in IO only as a related capability. The relationship of the UMT will be similar to the CMO and PA. This will allow the UMT to retain its statutory and traditional role of providing RS. By allowing the UMT to participate in IO, the UMTs primary purpose and rules under which it operates must not be compromised.
Requirements
Both Joint and Army doctrine will need to reflect these recommended changes for both 
Conclusion
In light of the current strategic and operational environment, these recommendations incorporate a vision of integrating the UMT in IO at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
The proposed recommendations are important because the status quo cannot be an option. To do nothing only prolongs the inevitable, a UMT will commit an error because the UMT operates without doctrine and the necessary training to support the IO mission. This error could have tactical, operational and even strategic consequences. 9 Ibid., p. 8.
10 Each of these documents, in of themselves, points to the importance of information just by their publication and distribution. Their purpose is to keep people informed. However, each document has a more powerful, underlying purpose, that is to influence the reader. The documents themselves become a tool within the information element of national power. The foundational document, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), provides a broad brush of how the U.S. government will provide for the security of the nation. Information policy is not mentioned. However, both information operations and public diplomacy are noted as important elements in the transformational process to meet the challenges of this century. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005) forward written by the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, states that "this strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable." This document becomes a tool of information policy in order to influence, by assuring friends and allies and dissuading adversaries. The defense strategy discusses eight key operational capabilities. These key capabilities contain elements of public diplomacy or information operations in each. Within the third capability, operating from the global commons, the document specifically addresses the need to transform information operations as a "core military competency." The third document within the quadrilateral of strategic references, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004), discusses the importance of interagency integration and information sharing as well as information operations within a combatant commander's strategic communications campaign. This is all part of "full spectrum dominance" requiring a transformation focus with the Armed Forces and military operations. The last document and the most recent publication, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006) , recognizes the capability gaps in strategic communications to include public diplomacy and information operations. To close this gap, DOD will "focus on organizing, training, equipping, and resourcing the key communication capabilities." 26 32 Ibid., paragraph 1-19. 33 Ibid., paragraph 1-19. 34 Ibid., paragraph 1-19. 35 Ibid., paragraph A-2. 36 Ibid., paragraph A-3. 37 Ibid., paragraph A-3. 38 As noted earlier in the paper, PA and CMO are related IO functions. Because the UMT has doctrinal responsibility to provide support to the commander in the execution of CMO as well as advising the commander on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations, the UMT already provides an IO related function. The author recommends the formal inclusion of religious support operations as a related IO function. This will precipitate doctrinal and training changes necessary for UMT success on the battlefield. Doctrine will also provide the parameters of UMT involvement in IO thereby alleviating mission creep that could preclude the provision of RS. If the changes recommended by the author occur, the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains may have to discuss the expanded role with the Endorsing Agents. As the proponent for policy, the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains has the
